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Abstract
We propose a life-cycle model of the housing market with a property ladder and
a credit constraint. We focus on equilibria which replicate the facts that credit con-
straints delay some households’ first home purchase and force other households to buy
a home smaller than they would like. The model helps us identify a powerful driver of
the housing market: the ability of young households to afford the down payment on
a starter home, and in particular their income. The model also highlights a channel
whereby changes in income may yield housing price overshooting, with prices of trade-
up homes displaying the most volatility, and a positive correlation between housing
prices and transactions. This channel relies on the capital gains or losses on starter
homes incurred by credit-constrained owners. We provide empirical support for our
arguments with evidence from both the U.K. and the U.S.
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1 Introduction
Buying a home requires a substantial amount of cash up front. The down-payment require-
ment limits the value of many first home purchases, primarily for younger households with
little savings. Once a household owns its first home, it must accumulate further wealth if it
wants to move up the property ladder. Any gains or losses on the first home have a major
impact on the household’s net worth and hence the timing of its next move.
We argue that understanding the equilibrium consequences of these features of hous-
ing consumption is key to understanding the volatility of housing prices, their tendency to
display overshooting patterns, fluctuations in their cross-sectional variance, and the rela-
tionship between housing prices and transactions.
We propose a life-cycle model of the housing market with two types of homes available
in limited supply, “starter” homes and “trade-up” homes, and a down-payment constraint
on borrowing. While all households enjoy living in a house of their own, they differ in the
utility premium they derive from a trade-up home compared to a starter home. Households
also differ in their income streams.
The first contribution of the model is to highlight the critical role of marginal first-
time buyers in housing market fluctuations. That is, any factor that affects the ability
of potential first-time buyers to afford the down payment on a starter home can have a
dramatic impact on the overall housing market. This points to the volatility in the income
of young households as a factor in some of the “excess” volatility of housing prices. The
same insight helps us rationalize large housing market swings following national institutional
reforms in financing availability.
The second contribution of the model is to shed new light on the mechanism whereby
down-payment constraints affect the transmission of income shocks to housing prices and
transactions. We show that this mechanism offers a rationale for the positive correlation
between housing prices and transactions observed in the U.S. and the U.K., given empirical
evidence on the response of housing prices to income shocks and on fluctuations in the
cross-sectional variance of housing prices.
Lamont and Stein (1999) and Malpezzi (1999) show in the U.S. and Miles and Andrew
(1997) in the U.K. that housing prices overreact to income shocks. Poterba (1991), Smith
and Tesarek (1991), Mayer (1993) and Earley (1996) provide evidence that the prices of
properties at the upper end appreciate more than the prices of cheaper properties during
a boom and depreciate at a higher rate during downturns. In the model, when both these
phenomena occur in response to a change in income, there are more housing transactions
when housing prices are on the rise and fewer when housing prices are on the decline. In
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both the U.S. and the U.K., there is evidence that this relationship between housing prices
and transactions has been holding over time; see Stein (1995) and Ortalo-Magne´ and Rady
(2004).
Young households are the marginal first-time buyers of starter homes in our model, and
the price of starter homes regulates entry into the housing market. Any household that can
afford the down payment on a starter home buys it. Thus the equilibrium price of starter
homes must be such that the number of first-time buyers who can afford the down payment
equals the number of homeowners who are leaving the housing market. This establishes a
direct link between the price of starter homes and the wealth of the youngest households.
A large proportion of households in our model have sufficient wealth to choose their
home without any concern for the down-payment constraint. Changes in the price of starter
homes shift their demand for trade-up homes in the obvious way. This establishes a first
link between the price of starter homes (and hence the ability of younger households to
afford down payments) and the price of trade-up homes.
There is a second way the price of starter homes affects the demand for trade-up homes:
capital gains. In response to an income increase, gains on starter homes make their owners
more able to afford the down payment on a trade-up home. To the extent that some of
the owners of starter homes are keen to move up the property ladder, this again shifts
the demand for trade-up homes upward. Once income stabilizes, gains on starter homes
disappear and the demand for trade-up homes shifts back down. The symmetric reasoning
applies for a negative change in incomes. The capital gains mechanism can explain both
why housing prices may display overshooting and why they depend on past incomes and
prices; see, for example, Case and Shiller (1989), Meese and Wallace (1994), Cho (1996)
and Capozza et al. (2002).
In the case of an income increase, gains on starter homes may affect enough owners that
the price of trade-up homes will overreact to the change in income, i.e., increase at a higher
rate than income. We show that whenever the capital gains channel is strong enough to
cause this overreaction in the price of trade-up homes, moves up the property ladder by
owners of starter homes generate an overall increase in transactions. The symmetric result
obtains for an income decrease.
In summary, if the effect of capital gains or losses on the housing demand of constrained
repeat buyers is strong enough to generate price overreaction, the level of prices, the cross-
sectional variance of prices and the number of transactions move with income. This is likely
to happen when: (1) few first-time buyers of starter homes pay cash for them, (2) there are
few first-time purchases of trade-up homes, and (3) changes in the relative price of homes
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have only a limited impact on the willingness of unconstrained households to move along
the property ladder.
Our approach is different from the traditional approach to modelling housing prices,
which treats homes like any other financial asset. Poterba (1991), for example, assumes
that a home provides units of housing services whose price is forward-looking, determined by
arbitrage in relation to other financial assets. This approach cannot account for the observed
time series properties of housing prices without some form of departure from rationality;
see Wheaton (1999). By design, this approach is silent with regard to fluctuations in
transactions and assumes constant relative prices for homes of different sizes.
The search for alternative frameworks to rationalize housing market dynamics has taken
primarily two directions. One line of research focuses on the search and matching features
of the housing market; see, for example, Arnott (1989), Wheaton (1990), Williams (1995),
Krainer (2001) and Krainer and LeRoy (2002). This approach has yielded a number of
insights that we see as complementary to our findings.1
A second line of research focuses on the role of credit market imperfections and house-
holds’ consumption demand for housing. Our work is closest to that of Stein (1995) in its
focus on down-payment constraints but differs in terms of model design and predictions.
Stein’s static model demonstrates how extreme credit distress may result in lower hous-
ing prices and fewer transactions because negative equity prevents some households from
moving. Assuming many households have too much debt to meet the down-payment re-
quirement on their current homes, he finds a lower equilibrium housing price than if there
were no down-payment constraint. The lower the price of housing, the more households
that find themselves with too much debt to move, hence the fewer transactions.
None of our results require such extreme joint distributions of housing and debt, and
our reasoning applies to booms as well as busts. In our dynamic framework, transactions
arise out of changes in the equilibrium allocation of properties from one period to the next;
the allocation of debt at the start of each period is the result of households’ optimizing
behaviour in the period before. Furthermore, our model incorporates first-time buyers, and
we allow the relative prices of homes of different sizes to fluctuate.
1Genesove and Mayer (2001) add another factor that could amplify the depth of housing market down-
turns. They provide evidence that nominal loss aversion on the part of sellers may contribute to depressing
housing transactions when prices decline. See also Engelhardt (2003).
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2 Empirical Evidence
We describe evidence on the relation between housing prices and the income of young
households, and between housing prices and transactions. We then draw on the empirical
literature to provide a background for our modelling choices.
2.1 Income of the young
Many empirical studies identify income as one of the drivers of housing prices; see, for
example, Poterba (1991), Englund and Ioannides (1997), Muellbauer and Murphy (1997),
Malpezzi (1999) and Sutton (2002). Researchers usually rely on average income measures
such as per capita disposable income. These average measure are meant to capture the fact
that when households are richer, they demand more of everything and thus more housing.
We abstract from this effect of income on housing demand. In our model, income drives
housing demand through a different and complementary mechanism: Changes in income
affect a household’s housing demand whenever they free the household from a binding
credit constraint. Most broadly, the model suggests that any factor that affects the housing
demand from potential first-time buyers has a direct impact on the housing market.
Figure 1 graphs real U.S. housing prices, per capita disposable income and the median
income of 25- to 34-year-old households, the time series closest to the income of the marginal
first-time buyers in our model.2 A simple linear regression using the yearly data from 1970
to 2003 confirms the visual impression; both variables have positive and highly significant
effects on housing prices.3
In Ortalo-Magne´ and Rady (1999), we document that down-payment requirements in
England and Wales dropped from 25� to 15� following the credit market liberalization
of the early 1980s. In response to such a change, the price of starter homes would rise by
66� in our model because, with the same savings, first-time buyers could afford the down
payment on a home 66� more expensive (0.66 = 0.25/0.15 − 1). The income of young
households in England and Wales grew by 27.5� over 1982-89.4 When we combine the
effects of this credit market liberalization and the growth in income, our model accounts
for the 88� housing price growth over the period.
2Data sources: FHLMC national conventional mortgage home price index, disposable personal income
from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, and median 25- to 34-year-old household income from the U.S.
Census Bureau. All variables are converted into real terms with the deflator used by the B.E.A. to deflate
the disposable personal income series.
3The estimated coefficients for income per capita and the median income of 25- to 34-year-old households
are 0.50 (0.06) and 0.78 (0.18), respectively; standard errors in parentheses. Together, the two income
variables explain 90 percent of housing price variations.
4According to Family Expenditure Survey and U.K. Economic Accounts, as compiled by Simons (1996).
4
70
85
100
115
130
145
160
19
70
19
72
19
74
19
76
19
78
19
80
19
82
19
84
19
86
19
88
19
90
19
92
19
94
19
96
19
98
20
00
20
02
Year
In
de
x 
(1
98
2-
4=
10
0)
Housing Prices Disposable Income Young Household Income
Figure 1: Real US housing prices and incomes
With regards to the subsequent housing market bust in England and Wales, Andrew
and Meen (2003b) find that changes in the income of young cohorts were a critical factor
of the declines in both transactions and prices.
2.2 Transactions
Stein (1995) provides evidence of a positive relationship between the number of transactions
and the percentage of change in prices in the U.S. over the period 1968-1992. Berkovec and
Goodman (1996) find a positive relationship between the percent changes in transactions
and prices over 1968-1993. Follain and Velz (1995), however, report a negative relationship
between the number of transactions and the housing price level in a panel of 22 U.S. cities
over 1986-1992.
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With the benefit of an extra decade of data since these studies, we run the regres-
sions reported in Stein (1995) using the same data source. We find a significant positive
relationship between transactions and price changes.5
In Ortalo-Magne´ and Rady (2004), we find the same positive relationship in data from
England and Wales over 1970-2002. Andrew and Meen (2003a) and Benito (2004) report
similar results.6
Holmans (1995) and Benito (2004) find that fluctuations in the overall number of trans-
actions are attributable mainly to fluctuations in the number of repeat buyers moving up
the property ladder, which accords with our model.
2.3 Model background
Caplin et al. (1997, p. 31) argue “it is almost impossible for a household to buy a home
without available liquid assets of at least 10� of the home’s value.” It is this effective
wealth requirement that we want to capture with the credit constraint in our model.
Studies of household-level data confirm that credit constraints restrict the housing con-
sumption of a significant proportion of households; see, for example, Ioannides (1989), Jones
(1989), Zorn (1989), Duca and Rosenthal (1994), Engelhardt (1996), Haurin, Hendershott
and Wachter (1996, 1997) and Engelhardt and Mayer (1998). Linneman and Wachter (1989)
find that the down-payment requirement in U.S. mortgages restricts households’ access to
credit more than the income constraint that precludes monthly payments above a given
fraction of income. Even when lending standards allow some households to buy property
without much initial wealth, the poorest buyers cannot borrow beyond the liquidation value
of their collateral. And buying a home without a reasonable down payment remains very
expensive.
According to the Annual National Survey of Recent Home Buyers in Major Metropolitan
Areas by the Chicago Title and Trust Company and the English Housing Survey, buyers’
own savings and housing equity are by far the two major sources of funds for repeat buyers;
down payments of first-time buyers come primarily from their savings. Engelhardt (1996)
5For example, for the U.S. as a whole, using annual price and transaction data from the National
Association of Realtors over 1968-2003, we obtain Transactions = 153686 � Price change + 122202.9 Time
trend + 289121.2 with standard errors equal to 18990, 6232 and 208105, respectively. The adjusted R2
is 0.92. The estimate for the effect of price changes is very similar to the one obtained by Stein: a 10
percent drop in prices is associated with a reduction of the number of transactions by about 1.5 million
units relative to an average of 4 million transactions per year in the 1990s.
6Leung et al. (2002) report evidence of a positive relationship between housing prices and transactions
for Hong Kong. Hort (2000) does not find any robust pattern in Swedish data. Bardhan et al. (2003)
report evidence of a positive relationship between capital gains at the bottom of the property ladder and
transactions at the top end of the ladder in Singapore.
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reports that only one-fifth of U.S. first-time buyers receive some help from relatives in
accumulating their down payment, and only 4 percent receive their whole down payment
from relatives. The vast majority of first-time buyers pay down payments out of their own
savings. Engelhardt and Mayer (1998) find that only 4 percent of repeat buyers receive
help from family and friends for their down payments.
The life-cycle pattern of housing consumption of a significant proportion of households
involves lumpy adjustments along the property ladder with jumps toward larger dwellings
when buyers are young. Evidence from housing surveys both in the U.S. and the U.K.
indicates that some households move to a more expensive property within a few years of
their first purchase. Ferna´ndez-Villaverde and Krueger (2002) report evidence consistent
with the view that households in the U.S. cannot move into their target home early in their
life cycle because of financial constraints and that they work their way up the property
ladder. Clark et al. (2003) provide support for this view. Households with the strongest
income growth tend to climb the ladder progressively except for the richest households, who
appear to move right away into a home at the upper end of the property ladder. Banks et al.
(2002) find that households in the U.K. also tend to climb the property ladder progressively.
They report that first-time buyers in the U.K. tend to be younger than first-time buyers in
the U.S. They attribute this difference in part to the lower down-payment requirement in
the U.K.
We assume housing preferences such that some households move up the ladder for pref-
erence reasons, and some down. There is some evidence that housing consumption declines
with age for the elderly, but this remains a debated issue in the literature; see, for exam-
ple, Mankiw and Weil (1989), Venti and Wise (1990, 1991, 2001), Green and Hendershott
(1996), Jones (1997) and Megbolugbe et al. (1997). What is critical in our model is that in
every period, some households move to a home cheaper than the one that they sell. This is
supported by evidence in both the U.S. and the U.K.; cf. Statistical Abstract of the U.S.
and English Housing Survey.
3 Model
The model must be rich enough to capture the interaction of households eager to climb the
property ladder but credit constrained, and wealthier households who choose their home
according to preferences. The concept of a property ladder requires at least two types of
dwelling. Climbing this minimal property ladder requires at least three periods: one period
to buy, one to trade up, and one to sell. For income shocks to affect the pace at which some
agents climb the property ladder, agents must differ in terms of wealth.
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There are many options available to characterize agents who trade without restrictions
imposed by wealth. We choose to add an extra period of life, a period when wealth is high
enough so that credit constraints no longer bind, no matter the type of property. Of course,
if not all wealthy agents are to hold the same dwelling, they must have heterogeneous
preferences. The challenge is to design a model that incorporates this double-heterogeneity
of wealth and preferences and still permits a tractable determination of equilibrium prices
and transaction volume.
3.1 Economic environment
Population. A measure one of agents is born at the start of each period. Each agent
lives for four periods, so the total population always has measure four. Within each cohort,
agents are distributed uniformly over the unit square. Each agent is identified by the indices
(i�m) ∈ [0� 1]× [0� 1] which determine her endowment stream and her preference for houses
relative to flats at age 4, respectively. While all agents learn their index i at the beginning
of life, they learn their index m at age 3 only.
Commodities. The commodities are a numeraire consumption good and two types of
dwellings: starter homes, called “flats” hereafter, and trade-up homes, called “houses.”
Each dwelling can accommodate only one agent, who must be an owner-occupier. Thus, the
set of possible housing choices is� = {∅� F� H}, where ∅ stands for no housing consumption,
F for a flat, and H for a house.
Endowments. Agents are born without any initial wealth. At age j = 1� . . . � 4, agent
(i�m) receives an endowment of ej(i) units of the numeraire good, where the functions
ej : [0� 1]→ IR+ are continuous and strictly increasing.
Preferences. The preferences of agent (i�m) are described by the utility function
4�
j=1
cj + U(h2�
1
2
) + U(h3�
1
2
) + U(h4�m)�
where cj is the non-negative amount of the numeraire good consumed in the jth period of
life; hj ∈ � is the type of housing enjoyed at the beginning of the jth period of life; and
the utility of housing is given by
U(h�m) =


−Δ if h = ∅�
0 if h = F�
u(m) if h = H
where Δ > 0, and u : [0� 1]→ IR is strictly increasing and continuous. Thus, all agents have
the same utility premium Δ for a flat relative to no housing. Up to age 3, all agents’ utility
premium for a house relative to a flat is u(1
2
). At age 3, they learn their preference index
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m before they trade in the housing market. Subsequently, all agents with preference index
m have the utility premium u(m) for a house relative to a flat.
Technology. Flats and houses are in fixed supply at measures SF and SH , respectively.
Agents have access to a storage technology for the numeraire good that allows them to save
at the exogenously given rate of interest r.
Credit constraints. Agents are allowed to borrow at the rate of interest r, but face a
borrowing constraint. An agent’s end-of-period non-housing wealth is not allowed to fall
below γ − 1 times the value of any property he owns, where 0 < γ < 1. This constraint
implies that in order to acquire property h ∈ {F�H}, an agent must have a total wealth
of at least γ times the price of the property. We will refer to this amount as the required
“down payment.”
Markets. In each period, there are competitive markets for flats and houses, with prices
denoted pF and pH . We use the notation p∅ for the “price” of the no-housing option; by
definition, p∅ = 0 at all times. There are no rental markets for dwellings and no other asset
markets.
Timing. Within each period, agents first derive utility from housing. Second, they receive
their endowment of the numeraire good; third, they trade in the housing market; and fourth,
they consume the numeraire good.
3.2 Comments
The age 1 and age 2 cohorts represent households whose housing consumption may be
limited by their wealth because of the credit constraint. First-time buyers build their down
payments solely from their own endowments; if need be, repeat buyers build their down
payments from their own endowments and any gains on their first purchase.
The age 3 cohort represents households whose housing choices are not restricted by the
credit constraint. The shock at age 3 to a household’s relative preference for houses and
flats (that is, the revelation of the preference index m) implies that not all unconstrained
households attach the same utility premium to houses relative to flats and that some house-
holds move due to preference reasons at age 3. The direction of these moves can be up the
property ladder as well as down.
The model allows for an arbitrary continuous income distribution within each cohort,
but requires the ranking of agents according to income to be invariant over the life cycle
for tractability.
The linear utility of non-housing consumption will imply that all such consumption is
postponed until the last period of life. This feature keeps the model analytically tractable,
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particularly with respect to the equilibrium law of motion of the distribution of dwellings
and savings.
We assume a fixed rate of return r on the storage technology in order to capture a small
open economy where the interest rate is set exogenously. We abstract from the effects of
shocks to interest rates (or equity returns) on the demand for housing.7
The assumption of a perfectly inelastic supply of flats and houses is not critical to our
results; the results obtain as long as supply is not perfectly elastic, which will hold as long
as the supply of land is upward sloping. Of course, everything else equal, prices would
respond less to changes in endowments, the higher the price elasticity of supply.
3.3 Parameter assumptions
We impose assumptions on the parameters of the model so that the steady-state equilibrium
of the model captures the interaction of the three groups of agents: constrained first-time
buyers, constrained repeat buyers, and unconstrained repeat buyers.
First, the supplies of flats and houses are assumed to satisfy
5
2
< SF + SH < 3 and
1
2
< SH < 1. (1)
The first condition implies that not all households can own property. The second condition
implies that within each cohort there must be some households that do not own a house.
Second, we assume that the down payment is greater than the discounted user cost of a
property when its price is constant; i.e.,
γ >
r
1 + r
. (2)
This ensures that a household who can afford the down payment on a property can also
afford to live in this property for one period when prices are constant.
Third, the endowment profiles ej : [0� 1]→ IR+ (j = 1� . . . � 3) are assumed to satisfy:
e1(0) = 0� (3)
e2(0) > e1(3− SF − SH)� (4)
e2(i) > e1(i) for all i ∈ [0� 1]� (5)
e3(0) > e(1)� (6)
e(1) > max{e1(1)� e(3− SF − SH)}+ rγ
−1e1(3− SF − SH)� (7)
7Flavin and Yamashita (2002), Flavin and Nakagawa (2003), Cocco (forthcoming) and Yao and Zhang
(forthcoming) study the interaction between housing demand and investments in other assets. Housing
returns are set exogenously in these models. Lustig and Van Nieuwerburgh (2004) analyze the impact of
housing price fluctuations on the pricing of stocks in a model where housing serves as collateral.
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where
e(i) = (1 + r) e1(i) + e2(i)
denotes the accumulated value of the endowments agents receive at ages 1 and 2.
Assumption (3) guarantees that some age 1 households cannot pay the down payment
on any dwelling. Thanks to assumption (4), however, all age 2 households will be able to
afford the down payment on a flat in steady state.
Assumption (5) specifies that households earn more at age 2 than at age 1. Combined
with assumption (2), this ensures that at constant housing prices, a household that can
pay the down payment on a given dwelling at age 1 can do so again at age 2, taking into
account the cost of holding that property from one period to the next.8
Assumption (6) gives age 3 households an endowment large enough to render both
housing alternatives affordable in the sense that no age 3 household faces a binding credit
constraint.
Assumption (7) will ensure that in steady-state equilibrium, some households trade up
from a flat to a house at age 2; this will allow capitals gains on flats to have an effect on
transitional dynamics.
Our last set of assumptions concern the parameters of the agents’ utility functions:
0 > u(1− SH)� (8)
u(1
2
) > (1 + r)2rγ−1 [e(1)− e1(3− SF − SH)] � (9)
Δ > u(1
2
) + (1 + r)2rγ−1e1(3− SF − SH). (10)
Assumption (8) ensures that not all houses are held by agents of age 3 when housing prices
are constant. Assumptions (9) and (10) will ensure that in steady state, each agent of age
2, 3 or 4 achieves a better trade-off between a dwelling’s utility and its effective cost when
they own a flat rather than no property, and all members of cohorts 2 and 3 achieve a still
better trade-off when they own a house.
In fact, the right-hand side of (9) will turn out to be an upper bound, at steady-state
prices, on the cost of choosing a house rather than a flat at age 1, 2, or 3, evaluated in terms
of numeraire consumption at age 4. Similarly, (1 + r)2rγ−1e1(3 − SF − SH) is an upper
bound on the cost of acquiring a flat, evaluated in terms of numeraire consumption at age
4.
8 Formally, under (2) and (5), e1(i) ≥ γph implies e(i)−rph > (2+r)γph−rph = γph+[(1+r)γ−r]ph >
γph.
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4 Recursive Equilibrium
The state of the economy at the beginning of a period is given by the collection of dis-
tribution functions � = (M∅�2�MF�2�MH�2�M∅�3�MF�3�MH�3�M∅�4�MF�4�MH�4) defined on
[0� 1] × IR, where Mh�j(i� w) is the measure of households of age j who own a property
of type h, and have an endowment index lower than or equal to i and non-housing wealth
lower than or equal to w. We do not need to include cohort 1 here as it is born without
any wealth or property.
The state of an individual household of age 1 is simply given by its endowment index
i. At age 2, the state of a household further comprises the dwelling h and the non-housing
wealth w with which it enters the given period. At ages 3 and 4, the preference index m
also becomes part of the state of the household.
In a recursive equilibrium, prices are deterministic time-invariant functions of the state
of the economy. This implies that household decisions depend on their individual state
variables and, through prices, on the state of the economy as a whole.
Definition 1. A recursive competitive equilibrium consists of
• a state space X, that is, a set of states � as defined above,
• decision rules c1(i� �), c2(i� h� w� �), c3(i�m� h� w� �) and c4(i�m� h� w� �) for numeraire
consumption,
• decision rules h1(i� �), h2(i� h� w� �), h3(i�m� h� w� �) and h4(i�m� h� w� �) for housing
purchases,
• decision rules w1(i� �), w2(i� h� w� �), w3(i�m� h� w� �) and w4(i�m� h� w� �) for next-
period non-housing wealth,
• value functions v1(i� �), v2(i� h� w� �), v3(i�m� h� w� �) and v4(i�m� h� w� �),
• property price functions pF (�) and pH(�), and
• a law of motion �� = φ(�) for the state of the economy
such that the following conditions hold:
(a) Given the law of motion for the state of the economy and the property price functions,
the decision rules solve agents’ maximization problems and generate the respective
value functions. That is, for all � ∈ X, and with Γj(i� h� w� �) denoting the set of all
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(c� h�� w�) ∈ IR+ ×�× IR such that:
c+ ph�(�) +
w�
1 + r
≤ ej(i) + ph(�) + w� (11)
w�
1 + r
≥ (γ − 1)ph�(�)� (12)
(a.1) c = c1(i� �), h
� = h1(i� �) and w
� = w1(i� �) solve
v1(i� �) = max
�c�h��w�)∈Γ��i�∅�0��)
�
c+ v2(i� h
�� w�� φ(�))
�
;
(a.2) c = c2(i� h� w� �), h
� = h2(i� h� w� �) and w
� = w2(i� h� w� �) solve
v2(i� h� w� �) = max
�c�h��w�)∈Γ2�i�h�w��)
�
c+ U(h� 1
2
) +
� 1
0
v3(i�m� h
�� w�� φ(�)) dm
�
;
(a.3) c = c3(i�m� h� w� �), h
� = h3(i�m� h� w� �) and w
� = w3(i�m� h� w� �) solve
v3(i�m� h� w� �) = max
�c�h��w�)∈Γ3�i�h�w��)
�
c+ U(h� 1
2
) + v4(i�m� h
�� w�� φ(�))
�
;
(a.4) c = c4(i�m� h� w� �), h
� = h4(i�m� h� w� �) and w
� = w4(i�m� h� w� �) solve
v4(i�m� h� w� �) = max
�c�h��w�)∈Γ4�i�h�w��)
�
c+ U(h�m)
�
;
where it is understood that the right-hand side equals −∞ if Γ4(i� h� w� �) is
empty.9
(b) Housing markets clear. That is, for all � ∈ X:
SF =
� 1
0
1h��i��)=F di+
�
h∈�
�
[0�1]×IR
1h2�i�h�w��)=F dMh�2(i� w)
+
�
h∈�
� 1
0
�
[0�1]×IR
1h3�i�m�h�w��)=F dMh�3(i� w) dm� (13)
SH =
� 1
0
1h��i��)=H di+
�
h∈�
�
[0�1]×IR
1h2�i�h�w��)=H dMh�2(i� w)
+
�
h∈�
� 1
0
�
[0�1]×IR
1h3�i�m�h�w��)=H dMh�3(i� w) dm� (14)
where 1ξ is the usual indicator function for statement ξ.
9Clearly, h4(i�m� h� w� �) = ∅ and w4(i�m� h� w� �) = 0 are optimal. This is taken into account in the
formulation of the market clearing conditions in (b).
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(c) The law of motion of the state of the economy is generated by agents’ decision rules.
That is:
φ
�

M∅�2
MF�2
MH�2
M∅�3
MF�3
MH�3
M∅�4
MF�4
MH�4


(i� w) =
�

� i
0
1h��y� �)=∅1w��y� �)≤w dy� i
0
1h��y��)=F1w��y��)≤w dy� i
0
1h��y��)=H1w��y��)≤w dy�
h∈�
�
[0�i]×IR
1h2�y�h�z��)=∅ 1w2�y�h�z��)≤w dMh�2(y� z)�
h∈�
�
[0�i]×IR
1h2�y�h�z��)=F 1w2�y�h�z��)≤w dMh�2(y� z)�
h∈�
�
[0�i]×IR
1h2�y�h�z��)=H 1w2�y�h�z��)≤w dMh�2(y� z)�
h∈�
� 1
0
�
[0�i]×IR
1h3�y�m�h�z��)=∅ 1w3�y�m�h�z��)≤w dMh�3(y� z) dm�
h∈�
� 1
0
�
[0�i]×IR
1h3�y�m�h�z��)=F 1w3�y�m�h�z��)≤w dMh�3(y� z) dm�
h∈�
� 1
0
�
[0�i]×IR
1h3�y�m�h�z��)=H 1w3�y�m�h�z��)≤w dMh�3(y� z) dm


.
5 Steady­State Equilibrium
Definition 2. A steady-state equilibrium is a recursive competitive equilibrium with a
singleton state space X = {�∗}.
In particular, every fixed point of the law of motion of a recursive competitive equilibrium
gives rise to a steady-state equilibrium.
In the remainder of the paper, we adopt the following convention. Given a continuous
and strictly increasing function f : [0� 1] → IR, we set f−1(x) = 1 for x > f(1), and
f−1(x) = 0 for x < f(0).
Proposition 1 There is a unique steady-state equilibrium. The price of flats in this equi-
librium is
p∗F = γ
−1e1(3− SF − SH). (15)
The price of houses� p∗H � solves
3− SH = e
−1
1 (γp
∗
H) + min
�
e−11 (γp
∗
F )� e
−1(γp∗H)
�
+ e−1(rp∗F + γp
∗
H)− e
−1
1 (γp
∗
F ) + u
−1(r[p∗H − p
∗
F ]). (16)
The steady-state allocation of properties at the beginning of each period is determined by the
critical endowment indices
i ∗F = e
−1
1 (γp
∗
F ) = 3− SF − SH � (17)
i ∗H = e
−1
1 (γp
∗
H)� (18)
i ∗∅H = e
−1(γp∗H)� (19)
i ∗FH = e
−1(rp∗F + γp
∗
H) (20)
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and the critical preference index
m ∗H = u
−1(r[p∗H − p
∗
F ])� (21)
where 0 < i ∗F <
1
2
< i ∗FH < i
∗
H ≤ 1� 0 < i
∗
∅H < i
∗
FH � and 0 < m
∗
H <
1
2
:
• Age 2 agents with endowment index i < i ∗F hold no property; those with i
∗
F < i < i
∗
H
hold a flat; and those with i > i ∗H hold a house.
• Age 3 agents with endowment index i < min{i ∗F � i
∗
∅H} or i
∗
F < i < i
∗
FH hold a flat;
those with min{i ∗F � i
∗
∅H} < i < i
∗
F or i > i
∗
FH hold a house.
• Age 4 agents with preference index m < m ∗H hold a flat; those with m > m
∗
H hold a
house.
The steady-state measures of flats and houses bought and sold each period are
n ∗F = i
∗
H − i
∗
F +min{i
∗
F � i
∗
∅H}+ (i
∗
F −min{i
∗
F � i
∗
∅H}+ 1− i
∗
FH)m
∗
H � (22)
n ∗H = 1 + i
∗
F −min{i
∗
F � i
∗
∅H} − i
∗
FH + (min{i
∗
F � i
∗
∅H}+ i
∗
FH − i
∗
F ) (1−m
∗
H). (23)
The critical endowment and preference indices identified in Proposition 1 are sufficient
to compute the state of the economy �∗ associated with the steady-state equilibrium. First,
as all non-housing consumption is postponed to age 4, a household’s state variable w at ages
2, 3 and 4 is determined fully by the history of endowments and housing choices. Second,
the critical indices are enough to determine almost every household’s history of housing
choices from its endowment index i and preference index m.10
Figure 2 depicts the steady-state allocation of properties to households at the beginning
of any period. The endowment index i increases from 0 to 1 as we move right. The preference
index m increases as we move up. This allocation is such that households complete up to
three housing transactions over the life cycle. Some buy their first property at age 1 (i ≥ i ∗F ),
and all others at age 2. Repeat buyers are either of age 2 (i ≥ i ∗FH) or age 3 (i ≥ i
∗
FH and
m < m ∗H , or i < i
∗
FH and m > m
∗
H). Some households purchase only one home over
the course of their lives (for example, i ∗F ≤ i < i
∗
FH and m < m
∗
H), some purchase three
(i ∗FH ≤ i < i
∗
H and m < m
∗
H), all others two.
These patterns of life-cycle behaviour match the empirical observations in both the U.S.
and the U.K. That is, (1) first-time buyers tend to be younger than repeat buyers; (2)
first-time buyers tend to buy cheaper properties than repeat buyers; (3) some households
move to a more expensive property within a few years of their first purchase; and (4) some
10The allocation of dwellings to the null set of age 4 households with preference index m = mH is
arbitrary.
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Age:
� i
�
m
2
i ∗F i
∗
H
∅ F H
3
�
min{i ∗F � i
∗
∅H}
i ∗F i
∗
FH
F H F H
4
m ∗H
F
H
Figure 2: Steady-state equilibrium allocation of properties
households move to a home cheaper than the one they sell. Computing the measure of
households that buy flats and houses in each cohort and adding up across cohorts yields
the expressions (22)–(23) for the steady-state transaction volumes.
Proposition 1 allows for i ∗H = 1 or i∅H ≥ i
∗
F , both leading to a simpler allocation of
properties than depicted in Figure 2. If i ∗H = 1, there are no house purchases at age 1; if
i∅H ≥ i
∗
F , there are no first-time purchases of houses at age 2. As i
∗
F < i
∗
FH < 1, however,
there are always some house purchases by households that owned a flat before. Given the
down-payment constraint, this creates a channel for capital gains or losses on flats to affect
the transition dynamics of our model economy.
The proof of Proposition 1 establishes that three statements must hold in any steady-
state equilibrium: (1) When weighing housing utility against user costs, all age 1 and 2
households find it optimal to acquire as much housing as possible, given their current wealth
and the down-payment constraint; (2) all age 2 households can afford the down payment on
a flat; and (3) when weighing housing utility against user costs, all age 3 households find it
optimal to acquire either a flat or a house, and in this choice they are not restricted by the
down-payment constraint.
These statements imply that the households that do not acquire any property must be
the poorest households in the economy, and hence households of age 1. Since there must be
a measure 3− SH − SF of them by market clearing, the steady-state price of flats must be
such that the households of age 1 with endowment index 3−SH−SF are just able to afford
the down payment on a flat. This yields the steady-state flat price p∗F defined in (15).
The three statements also imply that in any steady-state equilibrium, housing purchases
at age 1 and 2 are driven entirely by the credit constraint, while housing purchases at age
3 are determined entirely by preferences. This is why the beginning-of-period steady-state
allocation of properties to cohorts 2 and 3 is determined entirely by the endowment indices
iF and iH of the agents who are just able to finance a flat or a house, respectively, at age 1
and by the endowment indices i∅H and iFH of the agents who are just able to finance a house
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at age 2, having acquired no property or a flat, respectively, at age 1. The allocation of
properties to cohort 4 is determined entirely by the preference index mH of the households
who are indifferent between holding a flat and holding a house, given the steady-state user
costs of each.
Using these critical indices to compute the total demand for houses and imposing market
clearing yields equation (16) for the steady-state price of houses. Lemma A.1 in the Ap-
pendix shows that this equation has a unique solution p∗H and in particular that p
∗
H > p
∗
F .
It is then straightforward to verify that the prices p∗F and p
∗
H together with the housing
decisions derived from the critical indices (17)–(21) give rise to a unique steady-state equi-
librium.
To interpret equation (16), note that its left-hand side is the equilibrium measure of
agents of age 1 to 3 who do not acquire a house. On the right-hand side, e−11 is the
distribution function of age 1 endowments; e−1 is the distribution function of accumulated
age 1 and 2 endowments; and u−1 is the distribution function of utility premiums of houses
relative to flats after age 3.
The first term on the right-hand side is thus the measure of age 1 agents who cannot
afford the down payment on a house. The second term is the measure of age 2 agents who at
age 1 could not afford the down payment on a flat and now cannot afford the down payment
on a house. The difference e−1(rp∗F + γp
∗
H) − e
−1
1 (γp
∗
F ), which is shown to be positive in
Lemma A.1, is the measure of age 2 agents who at age 1 could afford the down payment on
a flat but, having held the flat from the last until the current period and having incurred
the user cost rp∗F , cannot afford the down payment on a house now. The last term on the
right-hand side of (16) is the measure of age 3 agents who, at constant prices p∗F and p
∗
H ,
prefer a flat to a house.
6 Permanent Changes in Endowments
Starting from the steady state described in the previous section, we want to investigate the
dynamic response of equilibrium prices and numbers of transactions to a small unanticipated
permanent change in agents’ endowments. We focus on proportional changes that multiply
each agent’s endowment by the same factor. We first discuss how steady-state prices change
with endowments. Then, we establish that for sufficiently small changes in endowments,
there is a recursive competitive equilibrium that reaches the new steady state within five
periods, with prices and the housing allocation settling down within two periods.
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6.1 Comparison of steady states
Consider endowment profiles {zej}
4
j=1 with a constant z > 0 such that all the condi-
tions set out in Section 3.3 continue to hold. By Proposition 1, there is again a unique
steady-state equilibrium, featuring an allocation of properties as in Figure 2. We de-
note variables pertaining to this new steady state by the superscript ∗∗. Thus, we have
p ∗∗F = γ
−1ze1(3− SF − SH) by the analogue of equation (15), while the price of houses p
∗∗
H
is uniquely determined by the analogue of equation (16):
3− SH = e
−1
1 (z
−1γp ∗∗H ) + min
�
e−11 (z
−1γp ∗∗F )� e
−1(z−1γp ∗∗H )
�
+ e−1(z−1[rp ∗∗F + γp
∗∗
H ])− e
−1
1 (z
−1γp ∗∗F ) + u
−1(r[p ∗∗H − p
∗∗
F ]). (24)
The corresponding critical endowment and preference indices are
i ∗∗F = e
−1
1 (z
−1γp ∗∗F ) = 3− SF − SH � (25)
i ∗∗H = e
−1
1 (z
−1γp ∗∗H )� (26)
i ∗∗∅H = e
−1(z−1γp ∗∗H )� (27)
i ∗∗FH = e
−1(z−1[rp ∗∗F + γp
∗∗
H ])� (28)
m ∗∗H = u
−1(r[p ∗∗H − p
∗∗
F ]). (29)
The following proposition compares steady-state prices:
Proposition 2 The steady-state price of flats is proportional to endowments:
p ∗∗F = zp
∗
F .
The steady-state price of houses changes less than proportionally with endowments� but
more� in absolute terms� than the price of flats:
p∗H + (z − 1)p
∗
F < p
∗∗
H < zp
∗
H if z > 1�
zp∗H < p
∗∗
H < p
∗
H + (z − 1)p
∗
F if z < 1.
Proportionality of the steady-state price of flats to z follows because this price is pro-
portional to the endowment of the age 1 households with endowment index 3 − SF − SH .
If the steady-state price of houses were to change proportionally to z as well, we would see
unchanged demand for houses by households of age 1 and 2, but, because of a proportional
change in the user cost difference between houses and flats, a decline (for z > 1) or increase
(for z < 1) in the demand by age 3 households. If the steady-state price of houses were to
change by the same amount as the steady-state price of flats, keeping the user cost differ-
ence unchanged, we would see unchanged demand for houses by age 3 households, but an
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increase (for z > 1) or decline (for z < 1) in the demand by households of age 1 and 2.
As both these scenarios are incompatible with market clearing in the new steady state, we
obtain the second part of Proposition 2.
6.2 Transition to the new steady state
Let p∗F and �
∗ be the price of flats and the state of the economy in the steady-state equilib-
rium for endowment profiles {ej}
4
j=1. Take this state as the initial condition of an economy
with endowment profiles {zej}
4
j=1. For z sufficiently close to 1, we construct a recursive com-
petitive equilibrium that reaches the steady state for endowment profiles {zej}
4
j=1 within
five periods, with housing prices and the housing allocation settling down within two pe-
riods. As before, we write �∗∗, p ∗∗F and p
∗∗
H for the state and the property prices in the
steady-state equilibrium for endowment profiles {zej}
4
j=1.
Proposition 3 For z sufficiently close to 1� an economy with endowment profiles {zej}
4
j=1
and initial condition �∗ admits a recursive competitive equilibrium with
• law of motion φ(�∗) = �1� φ(�1) = �2� φ(�2) = �3� φ(�3) = �∗∗ and φ(�∗∗) = �∗∗�
• flat prices pF (�) = p
∗∗
F = zp
∗
F for all � ∈ {�
∗� �1� �2� �3� �∗∗}�
• house prices pH(�
∗) = p+H and pH(�) = p
∗∗
H for all � ∈ {�
1� �2� �3� �∗∗}� where p+H is
the unique solution of
3− SH = e
−1
1 (z
−1γp+H) + min
�
e−11 (γp
∗
F )� e
−1
+ (γp
+
H)
�
+ e−1+ ((1 + r)p
∗
F − p
∗∗
F + γp
+
H)− e
−1
1 (γp
∗
F ) (30)
+ u−1((1 + r)p+H − p
∗∗
H − rp
∗∗
F )�
and e+(i) = (1 + r) e1(i) + ze2(i).
The idea behind the construction of this equilibrium is that for sufficiently small changes
in endowments, the allocation of properties in all states along the transition should be of
the same type as in the initial state �∗; that is, allocations should be fully determined by
critical endowment and preference indices as shown in Figure 2. Flat prices should continue
to be determined through the requirement that a measure 3−SF −SH of age 1 households
are unable to acquire any property because of a binding credit constraint. This means that
in all states along the transition, flat prices should be proportional to the endowment of the
age 1 households with endowment index 3 − SF − SH , and thus adjust within one period,
changing proportionally with endowments.
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With flat prices determined by contemporaneous age 1 endowments, the only lagged
variables needed to compute the critical indices that determine the demand for houses are
once-lagged age 1 endowments. These enter directly into i∅H , the endowment index of the
households that are just able to acquire a house at age 2 as their first property. In addition,
once-lagged age 1 endowments enter directly and through the lagged price of flats into iFH ,
the endowment index of the households that are just able to move from a flat to a house at
age 2. Thus, the price of houses and these critical indices should reach their new steady-
state levels within two periods – the time it takes for once-lagged age 1 endowments to
reach their new level.
It takes up to five periods for the state of the economy to settle on the new steady state
because the price of houses at the time endowments change, pH(�
∗), is different from the
new steady-state price of houses. If some households of age 1 buy a house at that price,
the joint income and wealth distribution keeps adjusting until these households leave the
economy four periods later.
We can interpret equation (30) much like equation (16). Note that e+(i) corresponds to
the endowments accumulated after two periods of life by a household that is age 1 under
endowment profiles {ej}
4
j=1 and age 2 under endowment profiles {zej}
4
j=1. The difference
e−1+ ((1+r)p
∗
F −p
∗∗
F +γp
+
H)−e
−1
1 (γp
∗
F ) is the measure of age 2 agents who own a flat in state
�
∗ and cannot afford the down payment on a house at price p+H . Here, we take advantage
of the fact that in state �∗, an age 2 household’s endowment index i and the prices p∗F and
p∗H determine the household’s dwelling h and non-housing wealth w at the beginning of
the period. In the case of an age 2 flat owner, we know that its endowment index satisfies
e1(i) ≥ γp
∗
F and that its non-housing wealth is w = (1 + r)[e1(i) − p
∗
F ]. With the changed
endowments and property prices, this household can afford the down payment on a house
if and only if w + ze2(i) + p
∗∗
F ≥ γp
+
H , or e+(i) ≥ (1 + r)p
∗
F − p
∗∗
F + γp
+
H . The last term on
the right-hand side of (30) is the measure of age 3 agents who, anticipating the user costs
(1 + r)p+H − p
∗∗
H and rp
∗∗
F for houses and flats, respectively, prefer a flat to a house.
The critical endowment and preference indices that characterize the allocation of prop-
erties in state �1 are
i+F = e
−1
1 (z
−1γp ∗∗F ) = 3− SF − SH � (31)
i+H = e
−1
1 (z
−1γp+H)� (32)
i+
∅H
= e−1+ (γp
+
H)� (33)
i+FH = e
−1
+ ((1 + r)p
∗
F − p
∗∗
F + γp
+
H)� (34)
m+H = u
−1((1 + r)p+H − p
∗∗
H − rp
∗∗
F ). (35)
20
As i+F = i
∗
F = i
∗∗
F = 3 − SF − SH , we henceforth write simply iF for this cut-off. The
transaction volumes arising in the transition from �∗ to �1 are
n+F = i
+
H − iF +min{iF � i
+
∅H
}+ (iF −min{iF � i
∗
∅H}+ 1− i
∗
FH)m
+
H � (36)
n+H = 1− i
+
H+ iF−min{iF � i
+
∅H
}+ i ∗H− i
+
FH+ (min{iF � i
∗
∅H}+ i
∗
FH− iF)(1−m
+
H). (37)
These numbers can be directly read off Figure 2 and its counterpart in state �1.
7 Price and Volume Dynamics
We can now analyse the reaction of property prices and transaction volumes to a small
change in endowments. Suppose the economy is in steady-state equilibrium with endowment
profiles {ej}
4
j=1. At time t = 0, endowment profiles shift permanently to {zej}
4
j=1, with z
close enough to 1 that Proposition 3 applies.11 From t = 0 on, the economy evolves according
to the recursive competitive equilibrium constructed above. The price of flats changes
proportionally with endowments at t = 0, reaching its new steady-state level p ∗∗F = zp
∗
F
immediately.
As to the price of houses at t = 0, it is straightforward to see that p+H > p
∗
H if z > 1, and
p+H < p
∗
H if z < 1. Suppose, for example, that endowments rise (z > 1). First, the demand
for houses from first-time buyers of age 1 and 2 shifts upward. Second, flat owners of age 2
have a dual advantage over their counterparts in the initial steady state: They enjoy both
higher endowments in the second period of their lives and capital gains on their flats. This
causes the demand for houses from repeat buyers of age 2 to shift upward. Third, the higher
price of flats and the expectation of a higher price differential between houses and flats in
the future (implied by the second part of Proposition 2) cause the demand for houses from
age 3 households to shift upward. Thus the price of houses must rise.
Note that the change in the price of houses depends on the change in age 1 endowments
in two ways: first, through the demand from credit-constrained age 1 buyers, and second,
through the change in the price of flats. Age 1 endowments are thus critical to both flat
and house price dynamics in our model.
How much does the price of houses change, and what does this mean for the concomitant
change in the number of transactions? We start the analysis with the case where capital
gains and losses on flats have the strongest possible effect on the dynamics of prices and
transaction volumes.
11In other words, we analyze the response of the economy to an unexpected change in endowments. By
continuity, the results obtained here remain if households attach a low positive probability to the change
in endowments.
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Definition 3. We say that all house purchases are repeat purchases if i ∗H = i
+
H = i
∗∗
H = 1
and min{i ∗∅H � i
+
∅H
� i ∗∗∅H} ≥ iF .
12 We say that the price of houses overshoots its new steady
state level if |p+H − p
∗
H | > |p
∗∗
H − p
∗
H |. Finally, we say that transaction volumes move with
prices if the differences n+H − n
∗
H , n
+
F − n
∗
F , p
+
H − p
∗
H and p
+
F − p
∗
F all have the same sign.
Proposition 4 Suppose that all house purchases are repeat purchases. Then� the price of
houses overshoots its new steady-state level if and only if
ze1(i
∗∗
FH) < p
∗∗
F � (38)
that is� if in the new steady state the price of flats exceeds the age 1 wealth of those households
that are the marginal house buyers at age 2. If the price of houses overshoots� transaction
volumes move with prices.
A sufficient condition for (38) in terms of the primitives of the model is the inequality
e1(1) < γ
−1e1(3− SF − SH).
To provide some intuition for this result, we first note that in the absence of first-time
buyers of houses, the demand for houses comes entirely from flat owners of age 2 and
households of age 3; market clearing for houses simply means i ∗FH + m
∗
H = i
+
FH + m
+
H =
i ∗∗FH +m
∗∗
H = 2− SH . What is more, the change in the price of houses from pH(�
∗) = p+H to
pH(�
1) = p ∗∗H is driven entirely by the wealth of the age 2 owners of flats. This is because
age 3 households’ willingness to pay for a house (which depends on the current price of flats
and predicted future property prices) is the same in the two states �∗ and �1, and hence in
periods t = 0 and t = 1.
Now assume z > 1 for concreteness, and consider an age 2 household that owns a flat
at the beginning of period 1. One period earlier, this household earned ze1(i) and bought
its flat at the price p ∗∗F . Contrast this with an age 2 household born one period earlier that
has the same income index and owns a flat at the beginning of period 0.
When this household was age 1 (and the economy was still in the old steady state),
it earned e1(i) and bought its flat at the price p
∗
F < p
∗∗
F ; that is, it earned less than the
first household, but bought its flat more cheaply. Under condition (38), the endowment
disadvantage is more than compensated by the price advantage; as both income and the
price of flats rise by the same proportion, and the income is lower than the price of flats,
the price rises by more than the income in absolute terms. Given that the resale value of a
flat is the same in periods 0 and 1, the household that is age 2 in period 0 is thus wealthier.
12With z close to 1, a sufficient condition for this in terms of the primitives of the model is e( 3
2
− SH) ≥
max{e1(1)� e(3−SF−SH)}+rγ
−1e1(3−SF−SH), which is stronger than assumption (6). In fact, arguing as
in the proof of Lemma A.1, one sees easily that this inequality implies p∗H > γ
−1max{e1(1)� e(3−SF−SH)}.
By continuity, z close to 1 then implies the same lower bound for p�H and p
∗∗
H .
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As this translates into a greater ability to pay for a house, the equilibrium price of houses
must be higher in period 0, so p+H > p
∗∗
H .
That is, owners of flats who reach age 2 as endowments rise enjoy capital gains, while
those one period later do not. Under condition (38), these capital gains outweigh the
endowment disadvantage at age 1 and cause the price of houses to overshoot.
Because of this overshooting, the difference between the costs of holding a house and
holding a flat from period 0 to period 1, (1− r)p+H − p
∗∗
H − rp
∗∗
F , exceeds the corresponding
difference in the new steady state, r[p ∗∗H − p
∗∗
F ], which by the second part of Proposition 2
in turn exceeds the corresponding difference in the initial steady state, r[p∗H − p
∗
F ]. This
means that the critical preference index m+H exceeds m
∗
H .
Relative to the initial steady state, the measure of age 3 house owners who buy a flat
in period 0 thus increases by (1 − i ∗FH)(m
+
H −m
∗
H); as the measure of first-time purchases
of flats is constant and equal to 1, the transaction volume for flats increases. The measure
of age 2 owners of flats who buy a house in period 0 increases by i ∗FH − i
+
FH = m
+
H −m
∗
H ,
while the number of age 3 flat owners who buy a house declines by i ∗FH (m
∗
H −m
+
H).
Figure 3 compares the resulting allocation of dwellings to households in period 1 and
the allocation in the initial steady state. The dark shaded area at age 3 results from the
increase in house purchases by age 2 households in period 0. The light shaded area at age
4 results from the decline in house purchases by age 3 households, and the dark shaded
area at age 4 from the increase in flat purchases by age 3 households. The rise in repeat
purchases at age 2 is the dominant force; it causes the transaction volume for houses to rise
as well.
Age:
� i
�
m
2
iF
∅ F
3
i�FH
i ∗FH
F H
4
m ∗H
i∗FH
m�H
F
H
Figure 3: Allocations of dwellings and transactions
The intuition behind the rise in transactions is that for house prices to overshoot, age 2
flat owners’ ability to pay for houses must have risen strongly. This increased ability to pay
allows more of these households to trade up, thereby causing a surge in house transactions.
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At the same time, more age 3 households trade down when the house price rises strongly,
which causes a surge in flat transactions.13
Note that the increase in the number of houses owned by the young does not mean a
one-for-one increase in the number of older households trading down from a house to a flat.
Instead, the shift in the distribution of houses in favour of the young is moderated by those
age 3 households that were planning to move to a house for preference reasons but now
choose to remain in their flat because houses have become more expensive.
The absence of first-time buyers of houses assumed in Proposition 4 makes capital gains
or losses on flats as strong a driver of equilibrium dynamics as possible. The impact of these
capital gains or losses is weaker in the presence of first-time buyers of houses because their
ability to pay for a house does not depend on the flat price.14
Still, as the result below shows, it remains true that whenever the house price reacts
strongly enough, transaction volumes move with prices.
Definition 4. We say that the price of houses overreacts to the change in endowments if
|p+H − p
∗
H | > |z − 1|p
∗
H .
By the second part of Proposition 2, this is a stronger condition than overshooting.
Proposition 5 If the price of houses overreacts� transaction volumes move with prices.
The intuition for this result is essentially the same as that given after Proposition 4.
If the house price overreacts to rising endowments, capital gains for credit-constrained flat
owners must have been large enough to compensate for the reduced demand for houses
by credit-constrained first-time buyers and unconstrained repeat buyers. These capital
gains allow more credit-constrained flat owners to trade up, which produces a surge in the
transaction volume for houses. At the same time, more credit-constrained first-time buyers
acquire flats and more unconstrained repeat buyers trade down from a house to a flat, so
the transaction volume for flats rises as well.
It remains to identify conditions for overreaction of the house price. If z > 1, we have
p+H > zp
∗
H if and only if the right-hand side of (30) with p
∗
H replaced by zp
∗
H is smaller
13Note that overshooting is not necessary to generate the co-movement of prices and volumes. In fact, it
is trivial to verify from (21) and (35) that m�H −m
∗
H has the same sign as p
�
H − p
∗
H and p
�
F − p
∗
F if and only
if
|p�H − p
∗
H | >
1
1 + r
|p ∗∗H − p
∗
H |+
r
1 + r
|p ∗∗F − p
∗
F |�
which is somewhat weaker than overshooting by the second part of Proposition 2.
14For example, condition (38) is necessary but no longer sufficient for overshooting of house prices when
some house purchases at age 2 are first-time purchases.
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than the left-hand side. Combining this with the characterization of p∗H in (16), we see that
p+H > zp
∗
H if and only if
e−1(rp∗F + γp
∗
H)− e
−1
+ ((1 + r)p
∗
F − p
∗∗
F + γzp
∗
H)
> min
�
iF � e
−1
+ (γzp
∗
H)
�
−min
�
iF � e
−1(γp∗H)
�
(39)
+ u−1((1 + r)zp∗H − p
∗∗
H − rp
∗∗
F )− u
−1(r[p∗H − p
∗
F ]).
It is straightforward to verify that the difference in the second line of (39) is non-negative,
while the difference in the third line is positive. So, a necessary condition for overreaction of
house prices to increasing endowments is that the left-hand side of (39) be strictly positive.
Proceeding as in the proof of Proposition 4, one sees easily that this is equivalent to the
inequality e1(i
∗
FH) < p
∗
F , which is reminiscent of condition (38) for overshooting when there
are no first-time buyers of houses, and has the same intuitive interpretation.
The difference in the second line of (39) is trivially lower than iF −min{iF � i
∗
∅H}, which
is the measure of age 2 first-time buyers of houses in the initial steady state. Overreaction
in the price of houses is more likely when that measure is small.
Finally, the difference in the third line of (39) shows that overreaction in the price of
houses is more likely when the density of utility premiums of houses over flats is small
around r[p∗H − p
∗
F ].
We are overall likely to observe overreaction in prices and a positive correlation between
prices and transactions when: (1) few first-time buyers of flats pay cash for them; (2) there
are few first-time purchases of houses; and (3) changes in the relative price of homes have
only a limited impact on the willingness of unconstrained households to move along the
property ladder.
8 Conclusion
We identify a new driver of housing prices: the ability of young households to afford the
down payment on a starter home. We present evidence of a strong and positive correlation
between housing prices and one of the determinants of this ability, the income of young
households.
We identify a new channel whereby changes in income affect housing price levels, the
relative prices of properties and housing transactions. Our model explains conditions under
which we expect prices to overshoot, to overreact to changes in income, and to display
a positive correlation with housing transactions. Critical in determining whether such
patterns occur in equilibrium is the extent to which changes in income affect the number
of credit-constrained owners moving up the property ladder.
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These results suggest avenues for further empirical research on housing consumption and
housing market fluctuations. A number of papers consider the effects of housing capital
gains or losses on household moving behaviour; see, for example, Genesove and Mayer
(1997), Henley (1998), Chan (2001), Engelhardt (2003) and Seslen (2004). None of them
considers this question conditional on purchase of the current home under a binding credit
constraint. Thus, the empirical literature does not speak to the capital gains channel we
identify in our model.
More could be learned from a focus on the factors identified as determinants of the
strength of the capital gains channel. For example, Lamont and Stein (1999) find that
housing prices are more likely to display overreaction to income shocks in Metropolitan
Statistical Areas (MSAs) where a large proportion of households have a high level of debt
relative to the value of their home. The distribution of debt is of course determined endoge-
nously. It would be interesting to see whether differences in the distribution of debt across
MSAs can be related to exogenous factors that determine the response of prices to income
changes in the model.
The model is analytically tractable despite its dynamic nature and the presence of credit
constraints, two assets, and two dimensions of household heterogeneity. This allows us to
provide a transparent characterization of basic forces that drive the housing market. Our
simplifying assumptions deserve some comments, however.
We assume households live for four periods. This does not mean we think of each
model period as representing a fourth of a typical household’s life span. Rather, four is
the minimum number of periods required to capture interactions in the market of first-
time buyers, credit-constrained repeat buyers, and unconstrained households that might
move due to preference reasons. Taking the model to data would require an increase in
the number of periods that households live. This would obviously increase the number of
income and price lags relevant to current prices and the current allocation. The relevant
number of lags would be determined by how long it takes credit-constrained households to
accumulate their down payments and climb the property ladder.
The model abstracts from “horizontal” transactions: moves by repeat buyers between
two homes within the same price range. In Ortalo-Magne´ and Rady (2000), we provide
evidence that fluctuations in the number of “vertical” transactions up and down the property
ladder accounted for most of the fluctuations in housing transactions in England and Wales
over the past three decades.
The model also abstracts from the option to rent a home. If rental properties are
different from owner-occupied properties and conversion is costly, our results extend readily.
In Ortalo-Magne´ and Rady (1999), we study the effects of income growth and credit market
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liberalization in a simpler variant of the model where starter homes can be either rented or
owner-occupied, with households preferring the latter. Chiuri and Jappelli (2003) provide
cross-country evidence in support of our predictions with regard to variation in the owner-
occupancy rates of different cohorts across countries. If all homes can be either rented or
owned and provide the same utility flow either way, then credit constraints are irrelevant
and our results disappear.
We assume an exogenous and constant interest rate, and we do not consider a number
of features of mortgage contracts. We also focus on the consumption demand for housing,
not any investment motive households may have. Relaxing some of our assumptions should
not affect the basic forces we identify.
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Appendix
Lemma A.1 shows that equation (16) has a unique solution and in particular that p∗H > p
∗
F .
Lemma A�1 Equation (16) has a unique solution p∗H � which satisfies the inequalities p
∗
F < p
∗
H and
1
2
<
e−1(rp∗F + γp
∗
H) < 1.
Proof: The function f : IR→ IR defined by
f(pH) = e
−1
1 (γpH) + min
�
e−11 (γp
∗
F )� e
−1(γpH)
�
+ e−1(rp∗F + γpH)− e
−1
1 (γp
∗
F ) + u
−1(r[pH − p
∗
F ]). (A.1)
is continuous and weakly increasing, constant at the negative level −e−11 (γp
∗
F ) for small pH , constant at
the level 3 for large pH , and strictly increasing everywhere else. So there is a unique real number p
∗
H such
that f(p∗H) = 3− SH .
Note that e−11 (γpH) ≤ 1 and min
�
e−11 (γp
∗
F )� e
−1(γpH)
�
− e−11 (γp
∗
F ) ≤ 0 for all pH . This implies that
f(γ−1[e( 1
2
)− rp∗F ]) ≤
3
2
+ u−1(rγ−1[e( 1
2
)− rp∗F − γp
∗
F ]). (A.2)
As e( 1
2
)− rp∗F − γp
∗
F < e(1)− γp
∗
F = e(1)− e1(3− SF − SH), assumption (9) implies that the second term
on the right-hand side of (A.2) is strictly smaller than 1
2
. So we have f(γ−1[e( 1
2
) − rp∗F ]) < 2 < 3 − SH
by the second part of assumption (1). This proves p∗H > γ
−1[e( 1
2
) − rp∗F ] or e
−1(rp∗F + γp
∗
H) >
1
2
. As
e( 1
2
) > e(3 − SF − SH) > (1 + rγ
−1)e1(3 − SF − SH) by assumptions (1)–(2) and (4)–(5), we also have
p∗H > p
∗
F .
By assumption (7), e(1)− rp∗F exceeds both e1(1) and e(3− SF − SH), so we have
f(γ−1[e(1)− rp∗F ]) = 2 + u
−1(rγ−1[e(1)− rp∗F − γp
∗
F ]). (A.3)
As e(1)− rp∗F > e1(3−SF −SH) = γp
∗
F by assumption (7) again, the second term on the right-hand side of
(A.3) exceeds u−1(0), which by assumption (8) is strictly larger than 1−SH . So we have f(γ
−1[e(1)−rp∗F ]) >
3− SH , which proves p
∗
H < γ
−1[e(1)− rp∗F ] or e
−1(rp∗F + γp
∗
H) < 1.
Note that this result implies e−1(rp∗F + γp
∗
H) > e
−1
1 (γp
∗
F ) as the latter equals 3 − SF − SH , which is
smaller than 1
2
by the first part of assumption (1).
Proof of Proposition �: Consider a steady-state equilibrium with flat price pF and house price pH .
Clearly, both these prices are strictly positive. The time-invariant ex post costs of holding a property from
one period to the next are ηF = rpF and ηH = rpH , respectively.
Suppose that pF ≥ pH and thus ηF ≥ ηH . Then, there is no demand for flats from agents of age 1 or 2
since houses yield higher utility to these agents and are not more expensive to hold than flats. Moreover,
ηH − ηF ≤ 0 < u(
1
2
) by assumption (9), so fewer than half of all age 3 agents demand a flat (whether they
are credit-constrained or not). Given that SF > 1 by assumption (1), therefore, the market for flats cannot
clear. This proves pF < pH .
By market clearing, the measure of agents who own no property in equilibrium is 3− SF − SH , which
by assumption (1) lies strictly between 0 and 1
2
. This is an upper bound on the measure of agents of age 1
who cannot afford a flat. As a consequence, the steady-state flat price must satisfy γpF ≤ e1(3−SF −SH)
or pF ≤ p
∗
F . By assumption (10), this implies (1 + r)
2ηF < Δ.
By assumption (8) and the fact that ηH > ηF , the demand for houses from cohort 3 is strictly lower
than SH . This means that some houses must be held by agents of age 1 or 2. Thus,
pH < γ
−1e(1)� (A.4)
the maximum price any agent of age 1 or 2 could pay.
As a consequence of the upper bound (A.4), all agents of age 3 are unconstrained in their choice of
housing. By an argument similar to the one in footnote 8, in fact, the total beginning-of-period wealth
of each age 3 agent amounts to at least e3(0), whatever the history of housing consumption. By (6) and
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(A.4), this is enough to cover the down payment γpH and, by (2) again, to permit positive consumption at
age 4. As the housing option chosen at age 3 is the one that maximizes the difference between the utility
of the option and the corresponding user cost, and ηF < Δ by what we saw earlier, owning a flat clearly
dominates owning no property for all age 3 agents. So the optimal housing correspondence at age 3 is
G3(m) =


{F} if m < mH �
{F�H} if m = mH �
{H} if m > mH �
(A.5)
where the critical preference index is
mH = u
−1(r[pH − pF ]). (A.6)
Cohort 3 thus demands a measure 1−mH of houses.
Since e2(0) > e1(3− SF − SH) ≥ γpF by assumption (4), all agents of age 2 can afford a flat, whatever
their housing consumption at age 1. (For households that acquired property at age 1, this is established in
footnote 8.) As the housing choice at age 2 does not affect the set of feasible housing choices at age 3, the
housing option chosen at age 2 is the one that maximizes the difference between the utility of the option
and (1 + r) times the corresponding user cost. As (1 + r)ηF < Δ by what we derived earlier, owning a flat
dominates owning no property for all age 2 agents.
Thus, agents who do not own a property must be of age 1, and there must be a measure 3−SF −SH of
them. Yet, we already know that any property affordable at age 1 continues to be so at age 2 (see footnote 8).
We also know that (1+r)2ηF < Δ, while assumption (10) implies Δ− (1+r)
2ηF > u(
1
2
)− (1+r)(ηH−ηF ).
At steady-state user costs, therefore, consuming a flat at age 2 and 3 dominates the no-property option
followed by a house. This means that those households that do not acquire a flat at age 1 want one,
but cannot afford the required down payment; as there are a measure 3− SF − SH of them, we must have
pF = p
∗
F . By (A.4) and assumption (9), we thus have (1+r)
2(ηH−ηF ) < u(
1
2
). This implies ηH−ηF < u(
1
2
);
hence 0 < mH <
1
2
.
At age 2, a flat is a feasible choice, and the housing choice at age 2 does not affect the set of feasible
housing choices at age 3. We have established that all age 2 agents will buy a property. We also know
that (1 + r)(ηH − ηF ) < u(
1
2
), so when the user cost difference is taken into account, a house dominates
a flat. Thus, housing choices at age 2 depend entirely on whether an agent can afford the down payment
on a house or not. For those agents who did not buy any property at age 1, therefore, the optimal housing
correspondence at age 2 is
G2(i� ∅) =
�
{F} if i < i∅H �
{H} if i ≥ i∅H �
(A.7)
where the critical endowment index,
i∅H = e
−1 (γpH) � (A.8)
is strictly smaller than 1 by (A.4). For agents who bought a flat at age 1, the optimal housing correspondence
at age 2 is G2(i� F ) = F if rpF + γpH > e(1); if rpF + γpH ≤ e(1), it is
G2(i� F ) =
�
{F} if i < iFH �
{H} if i ≥ iFH �
(A.9)
where the critical endowment index is
iFH = e
−1 (rpF + γpH) . (A.10)
And for agents who bought a house at age 1, the optimal housing correspondence at age 2 is G2(i�H) = {H}.
We already know that any property affordable at age 1 will continue to be so at age 2. We also know
that (1+r)2ηF < Δ and (1+r)
2(ηH−ηF ) < u(
1
2
), so a flat is better than no property, and a house is better
than a flat, when user costs are taken into account. Moreover, consuming a flat at age 2 and 3 dominates
the no-property option followed by a house. If γpH ≤ e1(1), therefore, the optimal housing correspondence
at age 1 is
G1(i) =


{∅} if i < iF �
{F} if iF ≤ i < iH �
{H} if i ≥ iH �
(A.11)
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where the critical endowment indices are
iF = e
−1
1 (γpF ) = 3− SF − SH � (A.12)
iH = e
−1
1 (γpH) . (A.13)
If γpH > e1(1), the optimal housing correspondence at age 1 is
G1(i) =
�
{∅} if i < iF �
{F} if i ≥ iF .
(A.14)
Cohort 1 demands a measure 1− iH of houses.
Note that iFH < iH if iH < 1 because the equality e1(iH) = γpH implies e(iH) > rpH+γpH > rpF+γpH
by the argument in footnote 8. As iFH ≤ iH trivially if iH = 1, we can conclude that iFH ≤ iH always.
Thus, cohort 2 demands a measure max{iF − i∅H � 0}+ 1−max{iF � iFH} of houses.
Since SH < 1 and 1−mH >
1
2
, cohorts 1 and 2 cannot acquire more than the measure 1
2
of houses in
equilibrium. This implies iH >
1
2
and max{iF � iFH} >
1
2
. As iF <
1
2
, the latter means iFH >
1
2
> iF . The
market clearing condition for houses thus becomes
1− iH +max{iF − i∅H � 0}+ 1− iFH + 1−mH = SH . (A.15)
After inserting pF = p
∗
F , this is equivalent to the equation f(pH) = 3− SH with the function f defined in
(A.1). The only possible steady-state house price is therefore pH = p
∗
H .
Setting pF = p
∗
F and pH = p
∗
H in (A.6), (A.8), (A.10), (A.12) and (A.13) yields the cutoff indices
(17)–(21). By Lemma (A.1), we have 1
2
< e−1(rp∗F + γp
∗
H) < 1. First, this means
1
2
< i ∗FH < 1; in
particular, i ∗FH < i
∗
H by the argument two paragraphs earlier. Second, it implies that γp
∗
H > e(
1
2
)− rp∗F >
(1 + r)γp∗F + e2(
1
2
)− rp∗F > e2(
1
2
) > e(0) by assumptions (1)–(3), hence i ∗∅H > 0. Third, it implies that p
∗
H
satisfies the upper bound (A.4), so by assumption (9) we have (1 + r)2(η∗H − η
∗
F ) < u(
1
2
) and 0 < m ∗H <
1
2
.
We also have (1 + r)2η∗F < Δ and Δ− (1 + r)
2η∗F > u(
1
2
)− (1 + r)(η∗H − η
∗
F ) by assumption (10). The
same arguments as above show that all agents of age 3 are unconstrained in their choice of housing, all
agents of age 2 can afford a flat, and any property affordable at age 1 continues to be affordable at age
2. Thus, the policy correspondences Gj , evaluated for the cutoff indices (17)–(21), describe the optimal
housing decisions when households face the time-invariant prices p∗F and p
∗
H . These decisions are the ones
described in the statement of the proposition, and as all non-housing consumption is postponed to age 4,
they uniquely determine, via the budget constraints, a state �∗ as well as households’ savings decisions.
That this constitutes a steady-state equilibrium is obvious from what we have shown before.
As to steady-state transaction volumes, the measure of age 1 agents who buy a flat each period is i ∗H−i
∗
F .
In the age 2 cohort, it is min{i ∗F � i
∗
∅H} (all those agents who could not afford a flat one period earlier and do
not move to a house now); and in the age 3 cohort, it is (i ∗F −min{i
∗
F � i
∗
∅H}+1− i
∗
FH)m
∗
H (all those agents
who lived in a house and now decide to move to a flat). A measure 1− i ∗H of agents buys a house at age 1, a
measure i ∗F −min{i
∗
F � i
∗
∅H}+ i
∗
H − i
∗
FH does so at age 2, and a measure (min{i
∗
F � i
∗
∅H}+ i
∗
FH − i
∗
F )(1−m
∗
H)
at age 3. This proves (22)–(23).
Proof of Proposition 2: Suppose z > 1. Evaluating the right-hand side of (24) with p ∗∗H replaced by
p∗H+(z−1)p
∗
F yields an expression that is easily seen to be strictly smaller than the right-hand side of (16),
hence smaller than 3 − SH . This proves that p
∗∗
H > p
∗
H + (z − 1)p
∗
F . Similarly, evaluating the right-hand
side of (24) with p ∗∗H replaced by zp
∗
H yields an expression that is easily seen to be strictly larger than the
right-hand side of (16), and so p ∗∗H < zp
∗
H . All inequalities are reversed if z < 1.
Proof of Proposition 3: We rely on the fact that in state �∗, a household’s endowment index i fully
determines its state variables w and h at age 2 and 3.
We set pF (�
∗) = p ∗∗F and pH(�
∗) = p�H , and define the decision rules
h1(i� �
∗) =


∅ if i < i�F �
F if γp�H > ze1(1) and i ≥ i
�
F �
or γp�H ≤ ze1(1) and i
�
F ≤ i < i
�
H �
H if γp�H ≤ ze1(1) and i ≥ i
�
H �
(A.16)
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h2(i� h� w� �
∗) =
�
F if i < min{i ∗F � i
�
∅H} or i
∗
F ≤ i < i
�
FH �
H if min{i ∗F � i
�
∅H} ≤ i < i
∗
F or i ≥ i
�
FH �
(A.17)
h3(i�m� h� w� �
∗) =
�
F if m < m�H �
H if m ≥ m�H �
(A.18)
h4(i� h� w� �
∗) = ∅ for housing consumption, and c1(i� �
∗) = c2(i� h� w� �
∗) = c3(i�m� h� w� �
∗) = 0,
c4(i�m� h� w� �
∗) = e4(i) + p
�
h + w for non-housing consumption. By the budget equations, they uniquely
determine decision rules w1(i� �
∗), w2(i� h� w� �
∗), w3(i�m� h� w� �
∗) and w4(i�m� h� w� �
∗) = 0 for next-period
non-housing wealth. By equation (30), the decision rules for housing are market clearing. Via the mapping
defined in part (c) of the definition of recursive equilibrium, the decision rules for housing consumption and
non-housing wealth yield a state φ(�∗) which we denote by �1.
Next, we set pF (�
1) = p ∗∗F and pH(�
1) = p ∗∗H , and define the decision rules
h1(i� �
1) =


∅ if i < i ∗∗F �
F if γp ∗∗H > ze1(1) and i ≥ i
∗∗
F �
or γp ∗∗H ≤ ze1(1) and i
∗∗
F ≤ i < i
∗∗
H �
H if γp ∗∗H ≤ ze1(1) and i ≥ i
∗∗
H �
(A.19)
h2(i� h� w� �
1) =
�
F if i < min{i�F � i
∗∗
∅H} or i
�
F ≤ i < i
∗∗
FH �
H if min{i�F � i
∗∗
∅H} ≤ i < i
�
F or i ≥ i
∗∗
FH �
(A.20)
h3(i�m� h� w� �
1) =
�
F if m < m ∗∗H �
H if m ≥ m ∗∗H �
(A.21)
h4(i� h� w� �
1) = ∅ for housing consumption, and c1(i� �
1) = c2(i� h� w� �
1) = c3(i�m� h� w� �
1) = 0,
c4(i�m� h� w� �
1) = e4(i) + p
∗∗
h + w for non-housing consumption. By the budget equations, they uniquely
determine decision rules for next-period non-housing wealth. As i�F = i
∗∗
F , equation (24) implies that the
decision rules for housing clear the markets. Via the mapping defined in part (c) of the definition of re-
cursive equilibrium, the decision rules for housing consumption and non-housing wealth yield a state φ(�1)
which we denote by �2.
Setting pF (�
2) = p ∗∗F and pH(�
2) = p ∗∗H , imposing the same decision rules in state �
2 as in state
�
1 and arguing as above, we obtain a state φ(�2) that we denote by �3. The distribution functions
M∅�2�MF�2�MH�2�M∅�3�MF�3 and MH�3 in state �
3 are identical to their counterparts in state �∗∗. There-
fore, setting pF (�
3) = p ∗∗F and pH(�
3) = p ∗∗H , imposing the same decision rules in state �
3 as in states �1
and �2, and proceeding as above, we obtain the state φ(�3) = �∗∗.
For � ∈ X and h ∈ {F�H}, let ηh(�) = (1 + r)ph(�) − ph(φ(�)). By continuity of the property prices
ph(�) in z, the following statements, that we obtained for z = 1 in the proof of Proposition 1, also hold
for all z sufficiently close to 1 and all � ∈ X: (1 + r)2η ∗F (�) < Δ, (1 + r)
2[η ∗H(�) − η
∗
F (�)] < u(
1
2
), and
Δ − (1 + r)2η ∗F (�) > u(
1
2
) − (1 + r)[η ∗H(φ(�)) − η
∗
F (φ(�))]; all agents of age 3 are unconstrained in their
choice of housing; all agents of age 2 can afford a flat; and any property affordable at age 1 continues to be
affordable at age 2. The same arguments as in the proof of Proposition 1 establish that the actions assigned
to households via the above decision rules are indeed optimal.
If z > 1, finally, the right-hand side of (30) with p�H replaced by p
∗
H is smaller than the right-hand side
of (16), hence smaller than 3 − SH , which establishes p
�
H > p
∗
H . In the same way, we see that p
�
H < p
∗
H if
z < 1.
Proof of Proposition 4: If all house purchases are repeat purchases, equation (30) for the house price
p�H simplifies to
2− SH = e
−1
�
�
(1 + r)p∗F − p
∗∗
F + γp
�
H
�
+ u−1
�
(1 + r)p�H − p
∗∗
H − rp
∗∗
F
�
� (A.22)
and equation (24) for the new steady-state house price p ∗∗H simplifies to
2− SH = e
−1
�
z−1[rp ∗∗F + γp
∗∗
H ]
�
+ u−1(r[p ∗∗H − p
∗∗
F ]). (A.23)
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Now suppose z > 1, so that p ∗∗H > p
∗
H . We have p
�
H > p
∗∗
H if and only if the right-hand side of (A.22)
with p�H replaced by p
∗∗
H is smaller than the left-hand side. By (A.23), this is the case if and only if
e−1� ((1 + r)p
∗
F − p
∗∗
F + γp
∗∗
H ) < e
−1
�
z−1[rp ∗∗F + γp
∗∗
H ]
�
. (A.24)
Noting that the term on the right-hand side of this inequality equals i ∗∗FH , we see that p
�
H > p
∗∗
H if and only
if
(1 + r)p∗F − p
∗∗
F + γp
∗∗
H < (1 + r)e1(i
∗∗
FH) + ze2(i
∗∗
FH). (A.25)
As (1+r)ze1(i
∗∗
FH)+ze2(i
∗∗
FH) = rp
∗∗
F +γp
∗∗
H and p
∗∗
F = zp
∗
F , we can simplify this inequality to e1(i
∗∗
FH) < p
∗
F ,
which is the same as (38). If z < 1, the result is obtained by the same steps, with the two inequalities
(A.24)–(A.25) reversed.
That overshooting implies changes of transaction volumes in the same direction as the changes in prices
is shown in the main text.
Proof of Proposition 5: Consider the case z > 1 and p�H > zp
∗
H . Comparing transactions taking
place in the transition from period 0 to period 1 to those in the initial steady state, we see more purchases
of flats at age 1 (i�H > i
∗
H), age 2 (min{iF� i
�
∅H} ≥ min{iF� i
∗
∅H}), and age 3 (m
�
H > m
∗
H). The volume
of transactions of flats rises with prices. By the market clearing condition for houses, on the other hand,
i ∗FH − i
�
FH − (i
�
H − i
∗
H) − (min{iF� i
�
∅H} − min{iF� i
∗
∅H}) = m
�
H − m
∗
H , so not only are there more house
purchases by flat owners of age 2 (i ∗FH > i
�
FH), but the increase i
∗
FH − i
�
FH in these purchases is great
enough to outweigh the loss of i�H − i
∗
H and min{iF� i
�
∅H} −min{iF� i
∗
∅H} first-time house purchases at age
1 and 2, respectively, as well as the loss of (min{iF� i
∗
∅H} + i
∗
FH − iF )(m
�
H −m
∗
H) repeat purchases at age
3. The volume of transactions of houses rises as well. The case of z < 1 and p�H < zp
∗
H is dealt with in
exactly the same way.
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